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Abstract 
This paper examines the accruals anomaly in an agency context where managers of overvalued firms have incentives to 
sustain overvaluation. We hypothesize that mangers anticipate the ultimate share price reversals and use high accruals to 
temporarily sustain overvaluation, while at the same time sell their shares. There is no incentive to deflate earnings of 
undervalued firms, leading to the prediction of an asymmetric relationship between trading and accruals. Our results 
support an agency explanation. Quadratic and binary regressions confirm that relationship between trades and accruals is 
concentrated on the selling side. The relationship between accruals and trading is only significant within the overvalued, 
low book-to-market (BM) firms. There is also evidence that low BM firms manage their earnings upward compared to 
high BM firms. 
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1. Introduction 
The accruals anomaly is one of many well-documented apparent contradictions of the efficient market 
hypothesis. First reported by Sloan (1996), a strategy of buying low accrual firms and selling high accrual 
firms yields significant returns. In his seminal paper and others, Sloan attributes misvaluation to investor 
fixation on earnings. The over- (under-) valuation of high (low) accrual firms subsequently adjusts resulting in 
a predictable negative relationship between accruals and returns.  
The abundant literature investigating the anomaly documents an important empirical regularity: mispricing 
related to positive accruals is not matched by mispricing related to negative accruals (Beneish and Vargus, 
2002; Barth and Hutton, 2004). Rather than being naïve and indiscriminate, investors’ fixation is one-sided, 
suggesting a need to refine our understanding of the anomaly. Kothari et al. (2006) advance an alternative 
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explanation for the accruals anomaly, citing a large body of literature articulating the agency theory of 
overvalued equity. Jensen (2005) defines and analyzes the agency costs of overvalued equity where firms 
become overvalued for various reasons, and managers get caught up in a game of meeting expectations.1 
Actions include using overvalued equity to make acquisitions (Moeller et al., 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003) delaying the release of bad news (Kothari et al., 2006) and income increasing earnings management 
(Jensen, 2005; Kothari et al., 2006). Specifically considering accruals as an earnings management tool, the 
ultimate price reversal for high accrual firms leads to the prediction of a negative relationship between high 
accruals and subsequent returns.  
Investor errors in interpreting accruals are at play in both explanations of the accruals anomaly, however 
there are important distinctions regarding motivation, mechanisms and implications. In the agency scenario, 
managers play a direct role, reporting inflated earnings to help sustain overvaluation. In order for the high 
accrual component of earnings to be an effective mechanism of manipulation, investors must misinterpret the 
elements of reported earnings. In contrast to the agency theory’s intent and action to mislead, the fixation 
hypothesis is silent regarding explicit managerial motivation and acts. Also, the agency theory of overvalued 
equity does not require investor fixation for firms to become overvalued. Accruals are part of the arsenal for 
sustaining overvaluation. Under the fixation hypothesis, cognitive errors are a direct cause of mispricing. 
Investors do not properly distinguish between the cash flow (permanent) and accrual (reversing) components 
of earnings in forecasting future performance. Firms with a high (low) component of accruals in earnings thus 
become over- (under-) valued. The mis-valuation adjusts quickly (as accruals reverse within the next few 
quarters) leading to low returns for high accrual firms, and high returns for low accrual firms.  
On the other hand, the agency theory is restricted to the relationship between high accruals and 
overvaluation. If the agency explanation is behind the accruals anomaly, the relationship between accruals and 
returns will be non-linear (asymmetric): mispricing is only related to high accruals which are part of the 
process of sustaining overvaluation that eventually corrects. Kothari et al. (2006) provide supporting evidence 
of asymmetry on the relation between accruals and returns (past, current and future), and other variables 
related to overvaluation (investment/financing, insider trading and analyst optimism) concentrated in the high 
accrual deciles. 
A key empirical distinction between the naïve fixation and overvalued equity explanations is the 
symmetry of the relation between the level of accruals and returns. Under the fixation hypothesis, investors 
are focusing on the earnings number, and errors are expected in both extreme levels of accruals. The predicted 
relationship between accruals and future returns will be linear (symmetric). 
Our investigation into the accruals anomaly focuses on the relationship between accruals and one variable: 
insider trading. This is a particularly interesting variable to use in exploring the accruals anomaly in the 
context of overvalued equity for several reasons. Jensen (2005) describes a distorted path taken by managers 
to validate market (and perhaps their own) growth expectations (e.g. acquisitions, excessive internal spending 
and risky investments) which eventually turns to accounting manipulation as challenges to meet the 
expectations mount. Accruals, one of many tools available for earnings management, are not particularly 
effective for sustaining valuation over a long time frame due to their short term, reversing nature. This is 
precisely the strength of the using insider trading an empirical test of the accruals anomaly in the agency 
context. At some point along the distorted path, the illusion of growth becomes increasingly difficult to 
maintain. We hypothesize that managers anticipating a share price correction use accruals to temporarily 
sustain overvaluation while at the same time sell their shares. Another advantage of using insider trading to 
understand the accruals anomaly is that gives rise to a clear empirical distinction of asymmetry versus 
linearity in the trading accruals relationship. The agency incentive for upwards earnings management and 
selling of overvalued firms is not matched by an incentive to manage earnings downwards and buy for 
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 Kothari et al. (2006) discuss the incentives managers have to sustain overvaluation such as equity-linked compensation, and reputation. 
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undervalued firms. On the other hand, under the fixation hypothesis mispricing is predicted for the extreme 
accrual firms and incentives for selling as well as buying arise.  
This study’s results of multivariate regression tests confirm an asymmetric relationship consistent with the 
agency scenario. Selling is related to income increasing accruals, however there is no relationship between 
buying and income decreasing accruals. In a more direct investigation into overvaluation, accruals and trading 
patterns we use valuation ratios and past growth. Estimates of the relationship between insider trading and 
accruals within book-to-market quintiles indicate that the relationship between accruals and trading is 
significant only for the over-valued firms (low BM) and is consistent with the agency theory of overvalued 
equity.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review and background for our 
research question and Section 3 presents the hypotheses. The empirical tests are specified and results are 
reported in Section 4, followed by concluding remarks in Section 5. 
2. Background 
The accruals anomaly was first identified by Sloan (1996) reporting returns to a hedge portfolio long low-
accrual stocks and short high-accrual stocks of 10.4 percent. Sloan interprets this as evidence that investors 
price earnings information without differentiating between the cash and accruals component. Earnings 
persistence associated with accruals is lower than that associated with cash flows but market prices do not 
reflect the differential persistence. Firms with high accruals relative to cash flow are thus overvalued, whereas 
those with low accruals are undervalued. The subsequent correction of the over- (under-) valuation results in a 
negative relationship between accruals and returns. Sloan’s speculation that this investor ‘fixation’ on 
earnings is behind the abnormal returns has gained wide acceptance in the enormous volume of literature that 
has followed.2 
The negative relationship between accruals and returns is well documented and shown to be robust to 
various measures, countries and time periods.3 The fixation explanation for the anomaly is not without 
detractors. In fact, as with other anomalies, its very existence is questioned on grounds such as: model 
misspecification (Kahn, 2008); data restrictions (Kothari et al., 2005); it is another anomaly in disguise 
(Collins and Hribar, 2000; Desai et al., 2004); and it captures the fundamental relationship between 
investment, accruals and returns (Zhang, 2007; Wu et al., 2010). Kothari (2001) points out many of the 
problems with tests of functional fixation including unidentified risk factors and research design.  
Evidence that the relation between accruals and returns (and other variables related to mispricing) is driven 
by high accruals and negative returns undermines the fixation hypothesis4 Thomas and Zhang’s (2002) work 
points to a specific use of accruals based earnings management in sustaining overvaluation through inventory 
changes. Documenting several empirical regularities in extreme inventory changes, they build an explanation 
based on demand shifts, where managers use accruals-based earnings management to disguise declining 
demand. Other studies provide direct evidence of a link between accruals-based earnings management and 
overvaluation using measures to control for the probability of overvaluation. 5  
A key element in investigating alternative explanations for the anomaly is the theoretical foundation 
yielding testable hypotheses. Despite substantial evidence that the anomaly is asymmetric, alternative 
theoretical models which explain the distinction between misvaluation of high versus low accruals have been 
lacking. Kothari et al. (2006) provide this important base with their proposal of the agency theory of 
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overvalued equity. In the agency scenario, the cause of misvaluation is not investor inability to differentiate 
between accrual and cash flow persistence. Rather, overvaluation is initially exogenously determined. The 
relationship between current accruals and subsequent returns results from attempts to sustain overvaluation 
through upwards earnings management and mispricing that eventuallyreverses.
Our work uses insider trading to continue the investigation. Several studies provide evidence that insiders 
act as informed traders (Jaffe, 1974; Penman, 1982, 1985). Direct links between insider trading and 
misvaluation are provided by Seyhun (1992), Rozeff and Zaman (1998) and Jenter (2005). Assuming that 
insider trading patterns reflect information about deviations from fundamental value, several studies test 
hypotheses with measures of the relationship between accruals and insider trades. For example, Beneish and 
Vargus (2002) argue that both accruals and trading are observable signals of managers’ private information 
and use accruals to distinguish between informative and opportunistic earnings management.  
Kothari et al. (2006) use insider trading as one of the test variables in their empirical investigation of the 
accruals anomaly, hypothesizing asymmetry in the relationship between accruals and trading. According to 
the agency theory of overvalued equity the upwards earnings management overvalued firms will cluster in the 
high accrual groups, whereas undervalued firms are expected to be dispersed across deciles In contrast, the 
fixation predicts overvaluation of high accrual firms and a corresponding undervaluation of low accrual firms. 
The asymmetry that Kothari et al. (2006) find for insider trading (concentrated in high accrual deciles) 
supports the agency theory.    
Our study complements and extends the evidence provided by Kothari et al. (2006) in several ways. An 
important enhancement to decile-based evidence is our multivariate regression tests that measure the 
relationship between accruals and insider trading while controlling for firm-specific effects. Kothari et al.’s 
(2006) evidence can be questioned on the basis of confounding effects, an important one of which is 
fundamental growth. Zhang (2007) and Wu et al. (2010) provide evidence that the accrual anomaly is at least 
partially explained by growth driven by investment and its effect on working capital. A plausible alternative 
explanation for the clustering of selling in the high accrual deciles is that insiders tend to be heavy sellers of 
high growth firms, rebalancing their portfolios which have become overexposed to their firm. In this scenario, 
accruals (such as addition to inventories and accounts receivable) are a function of growth and not part of the 
distorted managerial behaviour in the agency explanation. Univariate evidence risks leading to the conclusion 
that accruals and trading are related, when the true relationship is between growth and selling. The regression 
tests in our paper control for growth, as well as other variables that have been shown to be related to accruals.  
3. Empirical Tests and Results 
3.1. Sample and Key Variables 
The sample comprises 47,666 firm-year observations covering the period from 1991 to 2004. The trading 
data are from Thomson Financial and accounting data are from COMPUSTAT. Insider-trading behaviour is 
measured with the net purchase ratio (NPR) used by Kothari, et al (2006):  
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         (1) 
Where Buyi,t (Selli,t) equals the number of shares purchased (sold) by registered insiders of firm i during fiscal 
year, t.  
Models based on Jones (1991) and Dechow et al.’s (1995) modification have been widely adopted in 
studies measuring accruals: 
tititi DANDATA ,,, +=      (2) 
Where: 
TAi, t   = Firm i total accruals during year t. TA is the change in current assets plus change in short term debt, less 
change in cash, change in current liabilities, and depreciation expense. 
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NDAi,t = Firm i non-discretionary accruals during year t. 
DAi,t    = Firm i discretionary accruals during year t. 
  
We use both the Jones and modified-Jones models to estimate non-discretionary accruals: 
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Where: 
At-1 = Total assets at time t-1. 
¨RECt= Net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1. 
¨REVt= Revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1. 
PPEt = Gross property, plant and equipment year t 
Į1, Į2, Į3 = Firm parameters, estimated using OLS regression and data for all firms in a given SIC industry and year: 
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3.2. Relationship between accruals and trading 
We begin by investigating whether insider trading is consistent with the returns patterns characteristic of 
the accruals anomaly If insiders exploit the anomalous pattern of high (low) accruals, followed by negative 
(positive) returns, we expect that: 
H1 Insider selling (buying) is positively (negatively) related to accruals. 
The firms are grouped into six levels of trading on the basis of purchases. At the extremes are: All Buy 
(NPR = 1) and All Sell (NPR = -1). The other groups are majority buy (NPR between 0.5 and 1), buy equal 
sell (0.5  NPR  -0.5, except NPR = 0), majority sell (NPR between -0.5 and -1) and no trade (NPR = 0). 
Table I reports the number of firms in each group and the average and standard deviation of accruals 
estimated for the NPR groupings. 
 
Table I. Average accruals for trading groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selling dominates the trading, which is common in insider trading studies which report that the majority of 
observations indicating insiders’ consensus on firm valuation or prospects.  The buy groups’ negative accruals 
and the sell groups’ earnings increasing accruals support H1.  
We in investigate whether the relationship in Table I holds while controlling for other determinants of 
discretionary accruals (Cheng and Warfield, 2005) using the model:  
iti
n
nnti eLitLevSizeGrOCFaNPRGaDA +++++++= ¦
=
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1
0, ααααα
   (4) 
A: Descriptive Statistics 
NPR Group3 
DA_J1 DA_MJ2  
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. N 
All Buy -0.0051 0.1131 -0.0062 0.1167 8646 
Buy -0.0042 0.1125 -0.0049 0.1153 1463 
Buy = Sell -0.0041 0.1081 -0.0038 0.1113 2584 
Sell 0.0029 0.1024 0.0043 0.1056 5555 
All Sell 0.0033 0.1056 0.0044 0.1090 9735 
No Trade 0.0000 0.1118 -0.0006 0.1155 19683 
1DA_J: Estimated with Jones model. See equations (2) and (3). 
2DA_MJ: Estimated with Jones model. See equations (2) and (3). 
B: Difference in Accruals All Buy DA Minus All Sell DA
 Difference in Mean T Value p-value 
DA_J -0.0084 -5.204 0.000 
DA_MJ -0.0106 -6.326 0.000
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NPRG is a binary variable distinguishing between trade groups. DA measures accruals, OCF (operating cash 
flow) controls for the negative relationship between operating cash flow and accruals (Dechow et al., 1998). 
Gr, proxies for investment related growth and is included to control for the effect of investment activities. 
Other variables which have been shown to affect accruals are included as controls. 
Equation (4) is estimated with OLS regression. Significant negative coefficients for the All Buy and Buy 
groups, and significant positive coefficients for the All Sell group confirm an inverse relationship between 
trading and accruals. The results reported in Table II show that the results of Table I hold after controlling for 
variables related to discretionary accruals and provide further support for H1. Estimates of the control variable 
coefficients are consistent with expectations and empirical evidence.  
 
Table II. Regression estimates of trade groups’ average accruals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The distinction between fixation and agency hypotheses centers on asymmetric trading patterns in the high 
and low accrual groups. Assuming that insider trading patterns reflect private information about mispricing, 
the fixation hypothesis predicts that the relationship between accruals and trading is linear because both high- 
and low- accrual firms are misvalued. According to the agency hypothesis, the expected relationship is 
asymmetric because the income increasing earnings management associated with sustaining overvaluation is 
not matched by the expectation of income-decreasing earnings management for undervalued firms. We 
hypothesize: 
H2 The relationship between accruals trades is non-linear. Selling and high accruals are related low 
accruals and buying are not related. 
Using a continuous NPR variable and controlling for other interactions, we test for asymmetry (H2) by 
adding a quadratic term to the regression equation: 
DAi,t = a0 + a1NPRi,t +α2NPR
2
i,t + an
n=3
7¦ Controli,t +ei      (5) 
The coefficient α3  indicates whether the relationship is linear. In this regression the relationship between 
accruals is measured by α2 + α3.  A significant negative (positive) coefficient for α3 indicates that the 
relationship is stronger on the buy (sell) side.  
 
Table III. Quadratic Tests of Linearity 
 
 
 
 
 
 Int NPR NPR2 Adj R2 Error DF 
DA_J 
-0.0132 -0.0058 0.0041 
0.0276 27975 (4.96) (7.58) (1.89) 
DA_MJ 
-0.0140 -0.0066 0.0036 
0.0337 27975 (5.11) (8.31) (1.63) 
 Int All Buy Buy B = S Sell All Sell 
DA_J -0.0115 -0.0070 -0.0080 -0.0055 0.0018 0.0034 (8.15) (5.02) (2.74) (2.45) (1.06) (2.46) 
DA_M 
-0.0137 -0.0072 -0.0080 -0.0046 0.0030 0.0043 
(9.48) (4.99) (2.67) (1.98) (1.69) (3.04) 
OCF Gr Size Lev Lit Adj R2 
DA_J -0.0541 0.0082 0.0023 0.0153 -0.0108 0.036 (36.99) (7.78) (9.14) (5.02) (10.21) 
DA_M -0.0555 0.0157 0.0026 0.0115 -0.0112 0.041 (36.89) (14.37) (10.01) (3.67) (10.31) 
N = 47,655
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The results in Table III provide support for H2. The positive coefficient estimate for the quadratic term
;α3) in Panel A indicates the negative relationship between sells (buys) and accruals is strengthened 
(attenuated) as the NPR falls accruals is strengthened (attenuated) as the NPR falls. 
Using the modified-Jones coefficient the relationship between accruals and trading is estimated as: 
( ) ( )NPRNPR
DA
mj 0041.020066.0 ×+−=
∂
∂

Figure 1 depicts the relationship over the range of NPR -1 (All Sell) and +1 (All Buy) and the increasing 
slope as selling increases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In another test of asymmetry (H2) we add a binary term to the regression equation: 
DAi,t = a0 + a1NPRi,t +α2D*NPR
2
i,t + an
n=3
7¦ Controli,t +ei      (6)  
where D = 1 if All Sell or Sell, otherwise equals zero. Again, a significant α3 estimate indicates that the 
relationship between trading and accruals for the Sell and All Sell groups is different from the other groups. 
The non-linear relationship is confirmed by regression estimates of equation (7) indicating that the slope of 
the accruals/ trade relationship for the sell group is significantly higher than the other groups: all sell (NPR=-
1) the slope is –0.0029 – 0.0074= –0.0103, but for others the slope is –0.0029. 
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The next step of the investigation uses fundamental measures to test accrual and trading patterns for a 
subset of͕ potentially misvalued firms. A behavioural view of misvaluation is built on investors’ cognitive 
bias in overreacting to earnings, causing well (poorly) performing firms to become over- (under-) valued. One 
measure of this is extreme valuation ratios. Price-to-earnings (PE) and book-to-market (BM) ratios are 
popular empirical proxies. 
In line with the agency theory of overvalued equity we expect the incentives for overvalued firms to meet 
expectations and avoid disappointing markets are stronger than for fairly- or under-valued firms. We predict 
that upwards and the highest accruals will be associated with overvaluation: 
H3 Earnings management of overvalued firms is greater than earnings management of other firms͘
We begin by the separating the sample into book-to-market quintiles and comparing the trading across 
groups.  The results (not reported here) are consistent with Rozeff and Zaman (1998), where insider sales 
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Figure 1. Accrual/trading relationship quadratic estimation  
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dominate the low BM firms’ trades (lowest BM, whereas high BM firms trades are dominated by purchases. 
Average accruals for the lowest BM quintile (overvalued firms) are significantly higher than average accruals 
for the highest BM quintile (undervalued firms) providing support for H3 where earnings management is 
predicted to be higher for overvalued firms.  
We next use the multiple regression model specified by equation (7) including control variables. The 
regression is estimated with binary BM grouping variables as interaction terms in order to measure the 
relationship between accruals and trading within each group: 
DAi,t = a0 + a1NPRi,t + α n NPR * BMG n
n =2
5¦ + anControl i,t
a = 6
10¦ + ei     (7) 
The results reported in Table IV are also consistent with an agency story. The NPR interaction coefficients 
measure the incremental relationship between accruals and trading within The significant positive coefficients 
for the highest quintile effectively nets to zero (0.0067 - 0.0075 = -0.0008) indicating that there is no 
relationship between accruals and trading for the high BM firms, inconsistent with the fixation hypothesis 
where insiders would be expected to act on accrual related undervaluation. On the other hand, the relationship 
is negative for the other groups indicating an asymmetry consistent with the overvalued equity explanation of 
the accruals anomaly.  
 
Table IV. Trading-accrual relationship for BM groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between accruals and trading for the groups is illustrated in Figure 3. In sum, the results 
are consistent with insiders exploiting the accrual anomaly. Trading is concentrated on the selling side 
consistent with the agency explanation of the anomaly. The negative relationship we find in Table V builds on 
evidence of asymmetry and is arguably driven by selling on overvaluation.  
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the accruals anomaly from an agency perspective, contrasting it with the naive 
fixation hypothesis. Although these are not totally distinct hypotheses in that investor fixation on reported 
earnings is the fulcrum for the latter and a likely element in the former, there are important distinctions to be 
made in terms of mechanisms, actions and implications under each. 
 Int 
NPR*
BMG2 
NPR*
BMG3 
NPR*
BMG4 
NPR*
BMG5 NPR 
DA -0.0118 -0.0035 -0.0022 0.0023 0.0067 -0.0075 (5.94) (1.55) (0.99) (1.02) (2.90) (4.47) 
5 = Highest BM quintile    Adj R2 = 0.034       DF Error = 27972 
Figure 3.Trading/accruals relationship conditioned on valuation 
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The prevailing explanation of the accruals anomaly is that investors fixate on reported earnings and do not 
properly value the continuing (cash) and reversing (accrual) components of earnings. By definition, investors 
are naïve and do not distinguish between high and low accruals. Despite an abundance of studies reporting 
evidence that the accruals anomaly is driven by the relationship between high accruals and subsequent 
negative returns, economic rationale for, and a better understanding of, the anomaly have gone wanting. 
Kothari et al.’s (2006) proposition of the agency hypothesis of overvalued equity as an alternative explanation 
provides an important theoretical framework. 
This study uses insider trading and firm characteristics to investigate the accruals anomaly. The agency 
theory predicts that managers of overvalued firms respond to incentives to sustain it, a mechanism for which 
is income-increasing accruals. Overvaluation cannot be sustained indefinitely and prices revert as 
fundamentals are revealed. We hypothesize that managers anticipate the correction of overvaluation and sell 
their shares, and predict a relationship between selling and high accruals for overvalued firms. While 
managers of undervalued firms may benefit from purchasing their firms’ shares, they have no incentive to 
depress their earnings. 
Our empirical investigation centers on the prediction of an asymmetric relationship between accruals and 
managerial trading, which is distinct from the fixation prediction of a symmetry in misvaluation (both positive 
a negative accruals are incorrectly extrapolated). Multivariate, binary and quadratic regression tests of the 
relationship between insider trading patterns and accruals indicate that it is concentrated more strongly in the 
selling of high accrual firms. This contributes important evidence supporting the agency explanation advanced 
and supported by Kothari et al.’s (2006) accrual decile evidence. 
The agency explanation is further supported with evidence of asymmetric accrual related trading 
conditioned on valuation. Using book-to-market ratios to proxy for under- (low BM) and over- (high BM) 
valuation, we find a significant relationship high accruals and selling within the high BM group, whereas 
there is no relationship between trading and accruals in the low BM group. 
Whether one considers the agency theory of overvalued equity a distinct, competing hypothesis 
or subset of the fixation explanation for the accruals anomaly, an economic rationale for the well-
documented asymmetry in the accrual-return relationship is not well articulated in the literature. 
The agency perspective is fertile ground for understanding the relationship between accruals and returns 
when firms become misvalued. Further investigation into the interactions between the distortions in 
investment and operating decisions, and accounting manipulation through real and accrual based earnings 
management are avenues to be explored.  
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